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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
HOWARD ANDERSON, ET AL, 
Petitioners and Appellants, 
vs. 
UTAH COUNTY AND THE BOARD 
OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
OF UTAH COUNTY, 
Respondents. 
No. 
9549 
BRIEF OF PETITIONERS AND APPELLANTS 
Appeal from the Judgment of the 4th District Court for 
Utah County, Honorable F. W. Keller, Visiting Judge 
Throughout this brief all emphasis is ours. 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This case is to determine whether the Utah Right to Work 
Law, sometimes herein referred to as ((Law," or ((Act," applies 
to membership or nonmembership in a political party, and 
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specifically whether it was lawful under that Law for Utah 
County to fire 3 7 men from their county jobs because they were 
members of the Democratic Party. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The trial court held that the appellants had been damaged 
by their discharge but that the phrase of the Law ((labor union, 
labor organization or any other type of association" did not 
include political parties, and therefore denied the men the 
damages and injunctive relief which they sought. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants, by this appeal, seek to be reinstated in their 
jobs and to be compensated for the damage caused them by 
their being discharged as assessed and determined by the 
trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On Wednesday, January 4, 1961, the Board of Commis-
sioners of Utah County fired all but three of its highway 
department employees (R. 48, p 8). Of the three remaining, 
one was the supervisor of the north crew, one was the super-
visor of the south crew, and the other was the book and time 
keeper for the department. Their employment was terminated 
on Friday, two days later (R. 48, pp 73-4; R. 48, pp 44-6). · 
All employees so fired were Democrats and had campaigned 
for the Democratic Party in the previous fall election. 
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The Board of Commissioners then proceeded to fill the 
job vacancies in the Highway Department with people who 
were Republicans, and who were able to obtain, and did obtain, 
the Utah County Republican Party endorsement, a prerequisite 
for such employment (R. 48, pp 42, 43, 47). 
On Tuesday, January 3, 1961, the day before the wholesale 
firings, the political composition of the Board of Commissioners 
had changed from Democratic to Republican, when Democrat 
Marcellus Neilsen, having lost the election in November, 1960, 
relinquished his position on the Board to the successful Re-
publican candidate, Sterling Jones. The other commissioners 
were Republican Rulon Nichols, who had just been re-elected 
and Democrat Marion Hinckley, a holdover incumbent. 
On February 14, 1961, the petitioners filed this action 
seeking to be reinstated in their jobs and to be given a judgment 
for damages for their loss of wages. Their action was predicated 
on the Utah Right to Work Law, Laws of Utah, 1955, Chapter 
54; Title 34, Chapter 16 U.C.A., 1953. It was their position 
that this law prevented the County from firing them if a reason 
for their discharge was that they were members of any par-
ticular ccassociation"; and they asserted that the reason they 
were fired was because they were members of the Democratic 
Party and not members of the Republican Party ana that such 
parties were associations within the meaning of the Law. 
Respondents moved the Court to dismiss the case because 
petitioners had failed to state a cause of action. In support 
of the motion it was argued that the Legislature did not intend 
a political party to come within the meaning of the word 
ccassociation"' and that if it did mean to include political 
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parties, then the law was unconstitutional. The Court denied 
the motion and the case was tried before Judge Keller of the 
Seventh Judicial District at the instance and request of the 
presiding judge of the Fourth District. 
At the conclusion of the trial, the Court orally announced 
certain findings of fact (R. 48, p. 439-445), including a finding 
of damages for the thirty-seven petitioners who appeared at the 
trial to prosecute their claims, and also found as a reason for 
their discharge the fact that they were members of the Demo-
cratic Party. Having found the issues of fact sufficiently in 
favor of the petitioners to allow them relief from their loss of 
wages and other damages if the law applied to their circum-
stances, the Court then, after taking the matter under advise-
ment, held against them as to the law by reversing the position 
which the Court, with another judge sitting, had taken when 
it denied- respondents' Motion to Dismiss. 
In its Memorandum Decision the Court (R. 27-29) decides 
the case solely on the meaning of ccassociation". rry his case," 
says the Court, rrturns upon what the Court finds the legislative 
intention to be in its use of the words rany other type of asso-
ciation' as used in 34-16-2 UCA, 1953" (R. 27). The Court 
then ruled that political parties were not meant to be included 
within the phrase in question, and therefore denied petitioners 
the relief which they sought. The ensuing argument shall be 
limited to the sole point upon which the case turns, viz., the 
meaning of the phrase ((labor union, labor organization, or 
any other type of association." 
First, however, we herewith quote the pertinent sections 
of the Law which, in the view of appellants, have been violated 
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by the respondents, together with the remedies provided there-
for: 
"34-16-4. Any express or implied agreement, under-
standing or practice between any employer and any 
labor union, labor organization or any type of associa-
tion, whereby any person not a member of such union, 
organization or any other type of association shall be 
denied the right to work for an employer, or whereby 
membership or nonmembership in such labor union, 
labor organization or any other type of association 
is made a condition of employment or continuation of 
employment by such employer, or whereby any such 
union, organization or any other type of association 
acquires an employment monopoly in any <:,nterprise 
or industry, is hereby declared to be an illegal com-
bination or conspiracy and against public policy." 
cc34-16-5. Any express or implied agreement, under-
standing or practice which is designed to cause or 
require, or has the effect of causing or requiring, any 
employer or labor union, labor organization or any 
other type of association, whether or not a party thereto, 
to violate any provision of this act is hereby declared 
an illegal agreement, understanding, or practice and 
contrary to public policy." 
cc34-16-8. No employer shall require any person to 
become or remain a member of any labor union, labor 
organization or any other type of association as a con-
dition of employment or continuation of employment 
by such employer." 
cc34-16-9. No employer shall require any person to 
abstain or refrain from membership in any labor union, 
labor organization or any other type of association as 
a condition of employment or continuation of employ-
ment." 
cc34-16-11. Any employer, person, firm, association, 
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corporation, employee, labor union, labor organization 
or any other type of association injured as a result of 
any violation or threatened violation of any provision 
of this act or threatened with any such violation shall 
be entitled to injunctive relief against any and all 
violators or persons threatening violation, and also to 
recover from such violator or violators, or person or 
persons, any and all damages of any character cog-
nizable at common law resulting from such violations 
or threatened violations. Such remedies shall be inde-
pendent of and in addition to the penalties and reme-
dies prescribed in other provisions of this act.'' 
(( 34-16-12. In addition to the penal provisions of 
this act, any person, firm, corporation, association, or 
any labor union, labor organization or any other type 
of association, or any officer, representative, agent or 
member thereof may be restrained by injunction from 
doing or continuing to do any of the matters and things 
prohibited by this act." 
((34-16-13. Any person who may be denied employ-
ment or be deprived of continuation of his employment 
in violation of this act shall be entitled to recover from 
such employer and from any other person, firm, cor-
poration or association acting in concert with him by 
appropriate action in the courts of this state such 
damages as he may have sustained by reason of such 
denial or deprivation of employment." 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S MEMORANDUM DECISION 
INDICATES THAT THE RULING HEREIN IS IN ERROR 
IN THAT IT WAS AN UNWARRANTED JUDICIAL 
VETO OF LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE ACTION. 
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In ruling that a political party was not intended to be 
included in the word "association", the trial Court gives the 
following reasons for its decision (R. 28-29) : 
1. The phrase "any other type of association" 1s not 
explicit upon the question of whether political parties are 
included. 
2. It is only because the language may be construed as 
all inclusive that we draw the implication that political parties 
are included. 
3. Although a political party is an association, it is one 
which furthers a political end. 
4. To accept the language literally to include political 
parties would be imputing an unreasonable and absurd inten-
tion upon the part of the Legislature. 
5. We have no statutory law fixing the standards and 
tenure of public employees. 
6. It has been common to elect a person to office in order 
to provide other and different employees in a particular public 
employment. 
We respectfully observe that these reasons appear to us 
to accomplish no more than to reveal the trial Court's personal 
opposition and disagreement with the legislative and executive 
action in enacting this Law. This is not unexpected, for few 
laws in the history of our country have, at once, stirred such 
vigorous acceptance and opposition as has this type of legis-
lation. Of those who study such laws and their effects, there 
are few who view them passively. And if such be true of the 
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ordinary teright-to-work" law, much more is it true as to Utah's 
right-to-work Law, which clearly introduces a new but never-
theless logical and reasonable element v~hich is unique among 
such laws. 
Even so, the trial Court is not within its appropriate powers 
and rights when it exercises a veto power over legislation 
which has been duly enacted into law. In the above reasons 
for the Court's decision, we fail to find any valid rule of inter-
pretation or other legal basis to support or justify the ruling. 
What we do find, in our view, is nothing more nor less than 
a substitution of judicial judgment for that of the Legislature. 
As to reason 1, 2, 3 and 4, what the Court admits therein 
would appear to support our position. We are quite willing 
to concede that the appellants' case does rest upon the premise 
that the phrase teor any other type of association" is all inclu-
sive and that a political party is one of many types of associa-
tion; and, we assert, that the Legislature in its desire to be 
Hall inclusive" used general language rather than tC explicit" 
language to avoid the risk of overlooking some particular type 
of association in an enumeration. All that the trial Court 
does in its first four reasons for its decision is to admit these 
principles, then disagree with the logical result. We are here 
forced to observe that the same Court, with the presiding 
judge sitting, did not think it unreasonable and absurd that 
political parties were necessarily included in the phrase uor 
any other type of association" when it denied the County's 
Motion to Dismiss. This "unreasonable and absurd" point 
of view was, by the County, strongly urged upon the Court 
in support of its motion. 
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As to reason 5, we agree that there is no statutory law 
fixing the standards and tenure of public employees. But 
neither are there any statutory standards and tenure as to all 
the other people who are affected by the Law. When a law 
regulates an area of activity it does not follow that the law 
is invalid because it does not regulate other matters that may 
possibly be associated therewith, nor is there a rule of inter-
pretation that would even suggest it. Otherwise this Law 
would have to be nullified not only as to public employees, 
but also as to all other employees who are affected by it, thus 
nullifying the entire Act. 
As to reason 6, there is nothing to prevent a change of 
employees in public employment if the change is not brought 
about because of one's affiliation wtih some type of association 
-a matter which is, and which ought to be recognized as, quite 
irrelevant to that employment, whether public or private. 
And what the trial Court and all the rest of us have become 
accustomed to in the past in this respect will have to be altered 
as a result of our unique Right to Work Law, just as we are 
constantly modifying our habits by conforming to new and 
different rules in a constantly changing and dynamic society. 
The change may be more good than bad, or more bad than 
good, and, with time and testing, some social experiments 
will be eliminated or changed, but that is the nature, indeed 
the vitality, of a living and growing society; and it is not, 
under our constitutional form of government, the prerogative 
of a court to substitute its judgment for that of the Legislature. 
Time may, or may not, prove the trial Court to be more 
responsive to the public feeling as to this Law than the Legis-
lature, but that is not the issue. Whether the Law is popular 
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or not, it is the law, and while it stands, unrepealed by the 
Legislature, it ought not to be judicially vetoed as to any part 
of it just because that part seems ((absurd" to one of the 
judges of the Trial Court. For the part that seems absurd 
to one branch of the Court does not appear absurd to another 
branch of the same Court; and it is to many other minds the 
most sensible part of the Law as we shall hereinafter discuss. 
Mr. Justice Frankfurter in a concurring opinion in A.F.L. 
v. American Sash and Door Co., 335 U.S. 538, which was one 
of the cases involving the constitutionality of a rignt-to-work 
statute, makes an effective plea for judicial restraint in nulli-
fying legislative acts when he wrote: 
((Even where the social undesirability of a law may 
be convincingly urged, invalidation of the law by 
a court debilitates popular democratic government. 
Most laws dealing with economic and social problems 
are matters of trial and error. * * * But even if a 
law is found wanting on trial, it is better that its 
defects should be demonstrated and removed than that 
the law should be aborted by judical fiat. Such an 
assertion of judicial power deflects responsibility from 
those on whom in a democratic society it ultimately 
rests-the people.'' 
Concluding his thinking on this subject, Justice Frank-
further says: 
((Matters of policy, however, are by definition matters 
which demand the resolution of conflicts of value, and 
the elements of conflicting values are largely impon-
derable. Assessment of their competing worth involves 
differences of feeling; it is also an exercise in prophecy. 
Obviously the proper forum for mediating a clash of 
feelings and rendering a prophetic judgment is the 
10 
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body chosen for those purposes by the people. Its 
functions can be assumed by this Court only in dis-
regard of the historic limits of the Constitution." 
In support of its interpretation, the Court cites the case 
of Rowley vs. Public Service Commission, 112 Utah 116, 185 
Pac. 2nd 9 3 7. We fail to see any similarity of the problems 
of interpretation between that case and this case. We do, 
however, agree with the rules of interpretation therein an-
nounced and believe that such rules support our case. We 
refer especially to the following rule therein announced: 
t(W e have not overlooked the legal principle that 
if the intent of the legislature is by the statute made 
clear and certain, even though we rna y believe the 
legislation absurd and undesirable, we cannot substitute 
the judgment of the court for the judgment of the 
legislature. On the other hand, when the legislative 
intent is not clear and certain, and a literal interpreta-
tion of the language of the statute gives an absurd 
result, then the court is justified in searching the enact-
ment for further indications of legislative intent. These 
indications can be determined by the wording of the 
act or by considering the underlying reasons and 
necessity of the amendments and the purposes to be 
accomplished.'' 
The Trial Court admits that the intent of the Legislature 
is made clear and certain. It says: eel have arrived at the con-
clusion that to accept literally the language of this section 
would result in finding an unreasonable and absurd intention 
on the part of the Legislature * * * ." (R. 28). 
The Court also cites the case of Norvill vs. State Tax 
Commission, 98 Utah 170; 97 Pac. 2nd 937, another case 
where the factual problem is, we believe, dissimilar from the 
11 
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instant case but wherein rules of interpretation are announced 
with which we agree. We refer to the quotation by the Court 
from Sutherland on Statutory Construction, Section 24, Page 
320 (also quoted in the Rowley case): 
tcin the exposition of a statute the intention of the 
lawmaker will prevail over the literal sense of the 
terms; and its reason and intention will prevail over 
the strict letter. When the words are not explicit, the 
intention is to be collected from the context; from 
the occasion and necessity of the law; from the mischief 
felt, and the remedy in view; and the intention is to 
be taken or presumed according to what is consonant 
with reason and good discretion." 
It is among the purposes of this brief to show that the 
language of the statute clearly includes political parties within 
the meaning of tcassociation" as used in the Act, and that 
such meaning is reasonable, was so intended by the Legislature, 
that it dealt with the mischief felt and the remedy in view, 
and that the strong statement of public policy in the Act 
can be fully accomplished only by such an interpretation. 
POINT II 
THE APPROPRIATE LEGAL RULES OF STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION AND INTENT REQUIRE THE INCLU-
SION OF ALL TYPES OF ASSOCIATIONS WITHIN THE 
MEANING OF THE ACT. 
This Court has, many times, been required to rule on 
problems of statutory intent and construction. From a review 
of these cases we believe the following rules of interpretation 
clearly appear: 
12 
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1. That unless a statute is ambiguous, the meaning thereof 
must be found in the words of the Act itself. 
2. That words are used in their ordinary meaning and if 
any question arises as to their meaning, they should be inter-
preted liberally to make the law valid. 
3. That special consideration be given to the declared 
purpose and policy of the Legislature. 
4. That every word be given effect, and, if possible, the 
Court should avoid the rendering of any words ineffective or 
nugatory. 
5. That the use of the word ccor" 1n a ser1es does not 
unify the parts, but separates them. 
6. When the intent of the Legislature is made clear and 
certain, even though absurd and undesirable in the eyes of 
the Court, the Court cannot substitute its judgment for the 
judgment of the Legislature. 
Under Point I we have discussed the last of the rules 
above listed. We shall now refer to some cases and authorities 
which support the other rules of construction as listed . 
. In Spring Canyon Coal Company vs. Industrial Commis-
sion of Utah et al, 74 Utah 103, 116, 277 Pacific 206, this 
Court says: 
Ctit is a cardinal principal of uniform application 
in the construction or interpretation of a statute that 
the legislative intent as determined from the language 
used is of primary and controlling importance. When 
the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, 
courts are bound by such language. They may not 
13 
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resort to rules of statutory construction and interpre-
tation to defeat the clear and definite meaning of the 
language used in a statute." 
The general statement of the rule is also found in 50 
Am Jur (Statutes) Paragraph 227, Page 210: 
((The only mode in which the will of a legislature 
is spoken, is in the statute itself. Hence, in the con-
struction of statutes, it is the legislative intent mani-
fested in the statute that is of importance, and such 
intent must be determined primarily from the language 
of the statute, which affords the best means of its 
exposition. Indeed, it is the duty of the courts to give 
a statute the interpretation its language calls for, where 
this can reasonably be done, and the general rule is 
that no intent may be imputed to the legislature in 
the enactment of a law other than such as is supported 
by the face of the law itself. The courts may not 
speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature 
apart from the words. A statute is to be taken, con-
strued, and applied in the form enacted, and so de-
clared, announced, and expounded. Popular demand 
as to the enforcement of a law adds nothing to, and 
detracts nothing from, the duty of the court to con-
strue the law as it is. As a reason for these rules, it has 
been declared that the le gislautre must be assumed or 
presumed to know the meaning of u·ords, to have used 
the words of a statute advisedly, and to have expressed 
its intent by the use of the words found in the statute:"' 
An illustration of how the Court interpreted the meaning 
of the word Hcapital" is found in the case of Parkinson vs. 
State Bank of Millard County et al, 87 Utah 278, 35 Pac. 
2d 814. Plaintiff in that case contended that the word ((capital" 
included all of the bank's assets. The defendant's position was 
that the word ((capital" meant only the paid-up capital of 
14 
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the original incorporators and investors, in other words "capital 
stock." Revised statutes of 1933, 7-3-35, read as follows: 
~(Whenever any such bank shall accept an appoint-
ment as * * * executor * * * the capital of such bank 
shall be held as security for the faithful performance 
* * * " 
Plaintiffs claim arose as beneficiary of an estate which 
the bank was administering, and it became important to 
plaintiff that the word "capital" meant all of the bank's assets. 
In deciding what the word ((capital" meant, the Court 
considered the cases and also text book authorities, and then 
concluded as follows: 
ccln view of the text and judicial authorities referred 
to, it, by the great weight of authority, is clear that 
the term (capital' as applied to corporations generally 
including banking corporations, whether the term be 
regarded in a popular sense and in the common usage 
of the language or in a legal sense, embraces the actual 
estate including assets of the corporation, whether 
money or property owned by it, and whether represented 
by money paid in for shares of stock or other property 
acquired and owned by the corporation. * * * Ordi-
narily the legislature speaks only in general terms. Its 
intention and meaning primarily must be determined 
from language of the statute which should be given a 
liberal interpretation. Words and phrases are presumed 
to have been used according to the plain, natural, and 
common import and usage of the language, unless 
obviously used in a technical sense.JJ 
Again, in the case of Conover vs. Board of Education, 
110 Utah 454, 175 Pac. 2d 209, the statute in controversy 
was one which required an annual statement to be published 
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tn a newspaper of general circulation in the school district 
showing ''the moneys paid out, and for what paid, and in 
county school districts, also to whom paid." 
The school district contended that the part above quoted 
required that it show only (Cto whom" the money was paid 
and not what was paid. Conover, a taxpayer, believed that the 
general import of the statute also required a showing as to 
what was paid. In discussing the point, the Supreme Court 
quoted from a former case, Crocket vs. Board of Education, 
58 Utah 303, 199 Pac. 158, 159, as follows: 
(( 'It is apparent from a reading of the statute that 
it was designed for the benefit and interests of the 
citizen taxpayer so that they may be informed as to 
whether or not the financial affairs of the school dis-
trict each year have been properly and lawfully con-
ducted on the part of the Board of Education. 
r It is one of the cardinal rules of construction that 
a statute must be construed with reference to the objects 
sought to be accomplished by it. The mere general 
statement that certain sums of money were received 
and certain sums paid out on account of the support 
and maintenance of the public schools affords no infor-
mation to the taxpayer and subserves none of the pur-
poses intended by the enactment of the statute under 
consideration.' " 
In harmony with the pronouncements of our own Court 
is the following from 82 CJS, under the title of Statutes, Para-
graph 323, Page 593: 
"In construing a statute to give effect to the intent 
or purpose of the legislature, the court must look to 
the object to be accomplished, and the evils and mis-
chiefs sought to be remedied. In ascertaining the 
16 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
intent and purpose, the court must also look to the 
purpose to be subserved by the statute, and should 
place such construction on it as will, if possible. effect 
the purpose of the statute, and likewise according to 
the judicial decisions such construction as will render 
it valid even though it may be somewhat indefinite. 
c c In construing a statute to effect the legislative 
purpose it should be given a reasonable construction, 
or, as otherwise stated, it should be given a construction 
which is sensible, practical, workable, or liberal. If a 
statute is susceptible of more than one construction, 
it must be given that which will best effect its purpose 
rather than one which would defeat it, * * * . 
nWhen the purpose of an act is expressed in clear 
and unambiguous terms, this must be accepted as the 
solemn declaration of the sovereign, and taken as true 
unless incompatible with the meaning and e:ffect of 
the statute. Accordingly, the legislative declaration of 
purpose and policy is entitled to the gravest consider-
ation, unless overthrown by facts' of record, and a 
statute will, if possible, be given a construction which 
is consistent with its declared purpose.'' 
In determining legislative intent an important principle 
ts that every word in a statute is meaningful and must, if 
possible, be given an interpretation which will render every 
word operative. This principle is stated in the case of W rathall 
vs. Johnson, 86 Utah 50, 103: 
ccKeeping in mind at least two rules of statutory 
construction, first, if possible, every word and pt1rase 
of a statute must be given effect, and no word shall be 
rejected if possible to retain them and give them effect 
and meaning; and, second, the intent of the legislature 
must be ascertained and given effect, which intent and 
meaning is to be determined primarily from the lan-
17 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
guage of the statutes themselves, recogn1z1ng that in 
so doing it is not proper to consider a word or phrase 
disconnected from all parts of the act and rLcogoizjng 
that words and phrases must be given their ordinary 
meaning, unless it is necessary to give to particular 
words or phrases a restricted or an enlarged meaning 
so as to harmonize all the provisions of the statute 
and make them effective. Also keeping in mind the 
purpose for which the statute was enacted * * * ." 
An interesting application of the above rule appears in 
the case of Stevenson vs. Salt Lake City Corporation, 7 Utah 
2d 28, wherein the meaning of 10-8-40 U.C.A., 1953, was 
brought in question. By this statute cities are authorized 
((to license, tax, regulate and suppress billiards, pool, baga-
telle, pigeonhole or any other tables or implements kept or 
used for similar purpose; also pin alleys or table, or ball 
alleys; may also license, tax, regulate, prohibit or suppress 
dance halls, dancing resorts * * * . " 
Pursuant to the above statute, Salt Lake City passed an 
ordinance prohibiting bagatelle, pin ball, and marble ma-
chines. The District Court held this was beyond the authority 
of the city, which the Supreme Court affirmed. 
((Although ordinarily the words (suppress' and 
'prohibit' are somewhat synonymous in that they may 
mean to stop or prevent or keep back completely, they 
are clearly not meant to be synonymous in the statute 
involved herein. It is a common rule of const~"uction 
that U'herever possible each word in a statute must be 
given a meaning, and rthat construction is fat'Ofed 
which will render every u·ot·d operative, father than 
one tohich nzakes some words idle and nugcttory.' 50 
Am Jur, Statutes, Sec. 358, Pages 363-4. If ·\ve 'vere 
to hold that the legislature intended the words '~up-
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press' and {prohibit' to be synonymous, we would have 
to overlook the fact that the legislature in Sec. 10-8-4 
in dealing with billiards, pool, bagatelle, etc. only 
granted the cities the power to license, tax, regulate 
and suppress, whereas in dealing with the subject of 
dance halls, they were granted the power tJ license, 
tax, regulate, prohibit or suppress. If the legislaiure 
had not intended to grant different powers in the case 
of amusements than in that of resorts there would 
have been no necessity of dealing with them separately 
in the same section.'' 
Our Supreme Court has a~so expressed itself on the use 
of the disjunctive word nor." In Ringwood v. State, 8 Utah 
2d 287, the question arose as to whether one charged with 
drunkenness was required to submit himself to a blood test 
under a statute providing that nany person who operates a 
motor vehicle in this state shall be deemed to have given his 
consent to a chemical test of his breath, blood, urine or saliva 
for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his 
blood * * * ." The officer had advised the motorist that he 
must submit to a blood test. The Supreme Court did not agree 
with the officer. It said: 
t {The words being in a series, the only connective 
being the disjunctive tor', it applies to the whole 
series. Therefore, the ordinary and usual meaning of 
the language would be that the subject is deemed 
to give his consent to a test of some one of the desig-
nated substances, or of another, but not all of them. 
That is, of his breath, or of his blood, or of his urine, 
or of his saliva.'' 
In our view, the foregoing principles of statutory con-
struction should guide the Court in the interpretation of the 
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Law in question. But we cannot leave this subject without 
considering the testimony of witness J. Bracken Lee (which 
appears in full in the appendix), and Petitioners' Exhibit 
1 (R. 24). This evidence was offered by petitioners be-
cause the respondents and the Court had indicated some 
disposition toward the view that the Law was not plain 
and unambiguous on its face. We, therefore, at the trial 
proceeded on the theory that if the Court and our opponents 
wanted some interpretive assistance outside the language itself, 
we would be happy to accommodate them. But our efforts 
along this line were met by respondents' objections to Exhibit 
1 which was sustained so that it was not an influence upon 
the Court's decision. The Court, however, made the exhibit 
"part of the record so that the Supreme Court, if this case is 
appealed, may say whether or not I erred." 
Exhibit 1 (R. 24) is an official communication sent out 
by Governor Lee during the time he was Chief Executive of 
the State of Utah explaining the Right-to-Work Law (R. 48, 
p. 60). In the letter he says: 
((Although it is not generally known, the Utah 
'Right to Work' bill extends to any labor union, labor 
organization or tany other type of association' and is 
not confined to labor unions alone. It is essential that 
this be understood in order to gain a proper picture 
of the bill." 
The trial judge, referring to other statements in the letter, 
said during the trial: 
((this doesn't mention political parties either. * * * 
It simply says other organizations, and then he men-
tioned specifically others, like the Farm Bureau and 
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Church and so on, but doesn't mention the Democratic 
or Republican parties, so I don't think that I get any 
aid from the letter." (R. 48, p. 66). 
Exhibit 1, therefore, is an executive view of the Law 
which at most means all associations other than labor organi-
zations and at least means some associations other than labor 
organizations. We submit that if the phrase (Cor any other 
type of association" has a meaning that would include one 
association other than labor, it must, of necessity, include all 
associatons other than labor. 
That executive interpretation of statutes are proper aids 
to their construction is a rule well settled by this Court. Sinclair 
Refining Co. v. State Tax Commission et al, 102 Utah 340; 
E. C. Olsen Co. v. State Tax Commission, 109 Utah 563. See 
also 82 C.J.S., p. 778, para. 359, and Fleming v. Mohawk 
Wrecking and Lumber Co., 331 U.S. 111, where the U.S. 
Supreme Court says: 
(CSuch construction by the Chief Executive, being 
both contemporaneous and consistent, is entitled to 
great weight." 
While we take the position that the language of the Law 
is plain and unambiguous and that the foregoing rules of inter-
pretation point clearly to the fact that the intent was to include 
not only labor organizations but all types of associations, we 
also take an alternative view that if this Court believes that 
the Law is sufficiently obscure as to require aid outside the 
language itself, then Exhibit 1 should be considered and viewed 
with the significance herein discussed. 
With the foregoing interpretive rules and aids we now 
proceed to an analysis of the statute, confining ourselves to 
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an analysis of the language itself in the legislative setting 
then existing in this Country. 
POINT III 
POLITICAL PARTIES, INCLUDING THE DEMO-
CRATIC AND REPUBLICAN PARTIES OF UTAH COUN-
TY, ARE A TYPE OF ASSOCIATION AS CONTEM-
PLATED BY THE ACT. 
The Utah Right to Work Law is unique. When enacted 
tn February, 1955, there were 16 states which had already 
adopted and retained such laws, but the intent, purpose, and 
language of the Utah Law manifested a sharp departure from 
all other such laws in the scope of its coverage. In all the 
other states, the application of the right-to-work policy was 
limited to ( 1) labor organizations and (2) private industry, 
whereas, the Utah Law is not so limited, but includes any other 
type of association and also public employment. 
A list of the phrasing as to the area covered by the right-
to-work laws in these other states as of February, 1955, follows: 
Alabama: ((labor union or labor organization" SLL 10:285 
Arizona: "labor organization" SLL 12:276 
Arkansas: "labor unions" SLL 13:291 
Florida: Hany labor union or labor organization" SLL 
19:285 
Georgia: "a labor organization" SLL 20: 191 
Iowa: ( (any labor union, labor association or labor organi-
zation" SLL 25:195 
Mississippi: "any labor union or labor organization" SLL 
34:283 
Nebraska: "a labor organization" SLL 37:291 
Nevada: ((a labor organization" SLL 38-287 
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North Carolina: "any labor union or labor organization" 
SLL 43:285 
North Dakota: ccany labor union or labor organization" 
SLL 44:276 
South Dakota: "any labor union or labor organization" 
SLL 52:267 
South Carolina: "any labor union or labor organization" 
SLL 51:285 
Tennessee: "any labor union or employee organization of 
any kind" SLL 53:278 
Texas: "a labor union" SLL 54:281 
Virginia: ((any labor union or labor organization" SLL 
57:271 
In using the term labor union or labor organization some 
states define the term. Texas has such a definition, and then 
adds, ((and shall not include associations and organizations 
not commonly regarded as labor unions." 
It is apparent from these laws that they do not apply to 
the state government or to any of the states' political sub-
divisions. Employers are usually referred to as persons, asso-
ciations or corporations in a context restricted to employers 
and employees in private industry. Georgia specifically excludes 
from the statute's applictaion ((the state, or any political sub-
division thereof". So these statutes offer obvious warnings to 
the legislative draftsman if the intent was to be restrictive 
as to the area of its coverage. 
Now, how does Utah react to all of these significant guides? 
First, instead of saying cclabor union or labor organization," 
and then stopping as does every other state, Utah deliberately 
extends the area of coverage beyond labor unions and labor 
organizations by adding the significant phrase-significant in 
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view of the above: rror any other type of association." Then, 
not content to be unique in this respect, the Legislature again 
sharp! y departs from the sixteen states and defines employer 
so as to C(include all persons, firms, associations, corporations, 
the State of Utah, its counties, cities, school districts and other 
political subdivisions." 
If the Legislature wanted to restrict the application of 
the law to an employee's membership in unions only, as it was 
restricted in other states, how easy it would have been to 
plain! y do so by using language similar to the then existing 
legislation in those states. By adopting the provisions referred 
to above which were, and still are, peculiar only to the Utah 
Law, it is made very plain that the Legislature wanted to 
part company with the other states, and really make the right· 
to-work policy nondiscriminatory and of general application 
so as to apply also to an employee's membership in any other 
type of association. 
In 34-1-2, U.C.A., 1953, our labor laws had already defined 
a labor organization. Such an organization, as defined, is not 
difficult to identify. The Legislature either meant to restrict 
the coverage to a labor organization or it meant not to so 
restrict it. If it meant to so restrict it, there is no reasonable 
or logical explanation for the phrase in controversy and for 
its marked departure from the language of the laws of the 
other states. If in addition to labor organizations it meant 
also to cover associations other than labor unions, then the 
language is meaningful and will not do violence to the rules 
of statutory construction heretofore rendered by this Court, 
and can be used to effect the important declaration of policy 
in the Law. We believe that we can demonstrate that this is 
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a reasonable Law and an improvement over those laws from 
which the Legislature so obviously departed. 
This Law must be read and studied in the light of its very 
strong policy statement. This gives us a sure guide as to what 
was intended. The policy reads: 
"It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State 
of Utah that the right of persons to work, whether 
in private employment or for the State of Utah, its 
counties, cities, school districts or other political sub-
divisions, shall not be denied or abridged on account 
of membership or non-membership in any labor union, 
labor organization OR ANY OTHER TYPE OF AS-
SOCIATION; FURTHER, THAT THE RIGHT TO 
WORK MUST BE PROTECTED AND MAIN-
TAINED FREE FROM UNDUE RESTRAINTS AND 
COERCION." 
So what is it then that was intended? Simply this: That 
whatever other causes may deprive one of work, his membership 
or non-membership in an association-any type of association 
-was not to be the cause of such deprivation. What kind of 
association is involved? Any kind where membership or non-
membership therein can be used as a basis for denying or 
abridging the right to work. It makes no difference what 
functions such an association may perform. The Legislature 
was not concerned about the purposes or activities of an asso-
ciation to which an employee might belong. It wanted to 
assure a man his freedom to join or refrain from joining an 
association of whatever type he chose, civil, fraternal, political, 
religious, etc., because that was his own private business and 
concern which, as a free citizen, he had a right to exercise; 
and that in the exercise of the right to join an association 
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and in becoming a member thereof, his right to work was not 
to be abridged or denied because of membership or non-mem-
bership therein. The reasoning of the Legislature undoubtedly 
was that what a man does in his private life, independent of 
his daily work, is a matter which is entirely irrelevant to a 
man's ability to serve as an employee, and therefore ought 
not, in any way, to penalize him in his relations with his 
employer, certainly, at least, to the extent of depriving him 
of that employment. 
That Utah should be the State to enlarge the area of 
application of the right-to-work concept to include associations 
other than labor associations is not surprising in view of the 
traditional feeling in this state concerning the divine right 
of free agency to every individual in all phases of life. This 
view was recently expressed by President David 0. McKay 
of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. His opinion 
as to state right-to-work laws had been sought by the United 
States Chamber of Commerce. In a letter directed to the 
Chamber, dated June 23, 1961, and signed by Joseph Anderson, 
Secretary of the First Presidency, we read: 
((I am directed by President David 0. McKay, presi-
dent of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 
to advise you that we stand for the Constitution of the 
United States, and for all rights secured thereby to both 
sovereign states of the Union and to the individual 
citizen. 
UW e believe it is fundamental that the right to vol-
untary unionism should once again be re-established 
in this nation and that state right-to-work laws should 
be maintained inviolate. 
((At the very basis of all our doctrine stands the right 
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to the free agency of man. We are in favor of main-
taining this free agency to the greatest extent possible. 
We look upon any infringement thereof not essential 
to the proper exercise of police power of the state 
adversely." Salt Lake Tribune, Sunday, September 17, 
1961. 
President McKay's view that free agency should be main-
tained to the greatest extent possible and that ANY infringe-
ment thereof is looked upon adversely certainly reflects one 
of the most basic teachings of the people of this State from 
its earliest history and also mirrors the broad application of 
the Law's policy when it states: "further, that the right to 
work must be protected and maintained free from undue re-
straints and coercion." 
When Utah passed its Right to Work Law not one of the 
states that had such laws had any language to compare with 
the language above quoted. Arkansas' policy speaks of ((Free-
dom of organized labor," and Texas' policy speaks of ((The 
inherent right of a person to work and bargain freely with 
his employer," but none speak in the GENERAL language 
of the Utah Law, which makes no attempt to restrict the 
meaning to organized labor or to the specific right of a person 
to bargain with his employer. In our Law there is no limitation. 
It is simply that a man's right to work must be protected 
from undue restraint and coercion under ANY circumstance. 
And in no state would one be more like! y to find such a gen-
eralized approach to the problem than in Utah where the people 
have traditionally and with great fervor believed in the divine 
source of their free agency in all aspects of life. We venture 
the opinion that few, if any, state legislatures could be per-
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suaded to enact what this State has enacted by this Law, and 
that the reason for it does indeed rest in the belief of the people 
of Utah to which we here allude. 
In speaking of the policy of this State that the right to 
work should be protected and maintained free from undue 
restraint and coercion, where, we ask, can one find a greater 
tendency to violate the spirit of this policy than in the employ-
ment practices of our governmental agencies ? Where, in fact, 
can we look to find a more flagrant violation of this policy 
than in the wholesale firing of the petitioners on the day after 
the new political regime was sworn into office in Utah County 
on January 3, 1961? There is not one word of criticism in 
the entire record of the quality and excellence of the work 
which these petitioners had been rendering Utah County. On 
the contrary, there is strong commendation of the work and 
service which they had performed while employed by the 
County. (R. 32, 40). 
In view of such facts as are present in this case showing, 
as they do, such an aggravated abuse of a policy so simply 
and emphatically stated without reservations or limitations, 
how can our courts resist granting relief from such conduct? 
Note that after we read ttor any other type of association," 
there is a semicolon, then (:FURTHER, that the right to work 
must be protected and maintained free from undue restraints 
and coercion." This general language should leave no doubt 
as to the generality of the word uassociations," for the quoted 
phrase is entirely free of limitation. This is a significant 
contrast with the two states which speak of a policy of freedom 
of organized labor or of the freedom of a person to bargain 
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with his employer. Our State is concerned about the freedom 
of ALL labor to have their work protected and maintained 
even including government labor from undue restraints and 
coercion by virtue of their membership and activities in any 
type of association. 
In view of the general nature of the language used in this 
Law, it is appropriate to remind ourselves of Article I, Section 
24 of the Constitution of Utah: "All laws of a general nature 
shall have uniform operation." If this Law, therefore, is to 
apply to any labor it must apply to all labor. In this State a 
man is free to belong to any association without fearing that 
such affiliation shall influence his obtaining or retaining a job. 
EFFECT OF LAW 
If, as the Trial Court states, it would be "absurd" to 
include political parties within the meaning of association, 
it presumably and perhaps necessarily follows that the inclusion 
of any other type of association would be at least equally 
absurd. And, of course, it has been organized labor's view 
that this law as applied to labor is absurd. 
But let us analyze how the statute works. When an asso-
ciation is involved, how it is involved? Actually the association 
itself is never involved. What is involved is a dispute between 
an employer and an employee as to a particular grievance only, 
which is: Does the employee belong to some association that 
is obnoxious to the employer or does the employee not belong 
to some association to which the employer would like him 
to belong? The association itself and the employee's member-
ship or lack of membership therein is a fact which this Law 
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says shall not influence the employer-employee relationship; 
at least such fact cannot be a cause for denying or abridging 
the right of an employee to work for his employer. The 
grievance, the dispute, the rights of action, the liability-all 
exist between, and relate to, the employer and employee, and 
in no way involves the association to which the employee is or 
is not affiliated. 
The application of the law may be illustrated by one's 
membership in a union. When an employee joins a union he 
does so for the purpose of supporting the joint effort of all 
the employees in obtaining better wages and working condi-
tions. This law says that the employer cannot dismiss that 
employee for becoming or remaining a member of that union. 
As we understand it, respondents do not object to this part 
of the law. Yet in such a case it is very much a matter of 
concern to the employer because if a majority of his employees 
vote to have a union represent them as their collective bargain-
ing. agent, the employer is going to have pressure on him to 
divide a greater share of his profits with them. 
In this case the particular right to work that has been 
denied is the right of certain county employees to work for 
Utah County, and the denial is due to their membership or 
non-membership in a political association. Of all types of 
associations, other than labor organizations, that can have an 
influence on a man's right to work, probably none has had so 
much influence on that right than has our political parties. 
Judging from experience, none will come as close to a labor 
union situation as \vill a political party. This is because vic-
torious political candidates traditionally have even gone beyond 
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union shop principles and have often demanded not only that 
a job holder under his administration become a member of his 
political party, but have further insisted that the appointee 
already belong to the party before he gets his job. In other 
wards, they have followed a closed-shop practice, a practice 
which is outlawed as to unions both in the Taft-Hartley Act 
and also by our own State Law. 
Under a statement of policy so strong as is the statement 
of our right-to-work policy, and under phrasing throughout the 
entire Law that so consistently and obviously includes, ccany 
other type of association," can there be any serious question 
but that the Legislature intended to include political parties? 
If this law is a good and reasonable law as to an em-
ployee's membership in a labor union, a fortiori, it is a good 
and reasonable law as to an employee's membership in ((any 
other type of association." In applying the general policy of 
this law to a given employer-employee relationship, it makes 
no difference with what functions and objectives the association 
to which the employee belongs is involved. This law says such 
considerations must not be the cause of terminating that 
employer-employee relationship. Other reasons, yes, but not 
this reason. Freedom, says the Legislature, includes the right 
to join or refrain from joining any type of association, and 
the right to work for an employer, without the exercise of either 
right affecting the other. 
When the Legislature used the word ((association" to 
include all other groups, it used a word peculiarly applicable 
to a political party. If there are those who would, although 
illogically, attempt to convince us that the word ((association" 
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does not apply to the major political parties in this County, 
State and Nation, they will find no support from the political 
philosophers, nor from the legal encyclopedias, nor from the 
cases. 
From 29 CJS 107 (para. 84) we read: 
((Political parties result from voluntary assoctatzon 
of electors and not from operation of law; and are 
political rather than governmental instrumentalities, 
since such parties are the creation of free men, accord-
ing to their own wisdom, and in no sense whatever 
the creation of any department of the government." 
The leading case on this subject is Bell v. Hill, 74 S W 2nd 
113, 114 (1934). This was a petition by some negroes asking 
that they be permitted to vote in the primaries of the Democratic 
Party in Texas. In discussing the problem, the Court said: 
((In order that we may understand the questions 
involved in this case, it is essential that we clearly 
comprehend the nature of a political party, such as the 
Democratic Party. First of all, it is a voluntary asso-
ciation; an association formed of the free will and 
unrestrained choice of those who compose it. No man 
is compelled by law to become a member of a political 
party; or, after having become such, to remain a mem-
ber. He may join such a party for whatev~r reason 
seems good to him, and may quit the party for any 
cause, good, bad, or indifferent, or without cause. A 
political party is the creation of free _men, acting accord-
ing to their own wisdom, and in no sense whatever 
the creation of any department of the government." 
* * * (The court then quotes at length from 49 CJ p 
1075 and emphasizes by italics the ((voluntary asso-
ciation" aspect thereof.) 
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The Court says much more concerning political parties as 
associations a~d in so doing quotes at great length from De 
Tocqueville' s nDemocracy in America" (first published in 
1837). The court comments that De Tocqueville nnoted at 
length the celerity with which voluntary associations were 
formed by the people of the United States for political and 
other purposes, and the effect which these associations had, 
not only on governmental affairs, but on social and business 
endeavors as well." 'fhe Court then quotes from De Tocqueville 
as follows: 
nln no country in the world has the principle of 
association been more successfully used, or more un-
sparingly applied to a multiple of different objects, 
than in America. * * * 
nAn association consists simply in the public assent 
which a number of individuals give to certain doc-
trines; and in the engagement which they contract to 
promote the spread of those doctrines by their exer-
tions. * * * 
tcThe second degree in the right of association is the 
power of meeting * * * men have the opportunity of 
seeing each other; means of execution are more readily 
combined; and opinions are maintained with a degree 
of warmth and energy which written language cannot 
approach. 
nlastly, in the exercise of the right of political asso-
ciation, the partisans of an opinion may unite in 
electoral bodies, and choose delegates to represent 
them in a central assembly. * * * 
nln America the liberty of association for political 
purposes is unbounded.'' * * * 
CCThe most natural privilege of man, next to the 
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right of acting for himself, is that of combining his 
exertions with those of his fellow creatures, and of 
acting in common with them. I am therefore led to 
conclude that the right of association is almost as in-
alienable as the right of personal liberty. No legislator 
can attack it without impairing the very foundation 
of society." * * * 
((There is only one country on the face of the earth 
where the citizens enjoy unlimited freedom of asso-
ciation for politi~al purposes. This same country is 
the only one in the world where the continued exercise 
of the right of association has been introduced into 
civil life, and where all the advantages which civili-
zation can confer are procured by means of it. 
n In all the countries where political associations 
are prohibited, civil associations are rare. It is hardly 
probable that this is the result of accident; but the 
inference should rather be, that there is a natural and 
perhaps a necessary connection between these two kinds 
of associations." 
((Civil associations, therefore, facilitate political 
association; but on the other hand, political association 
singular! y strengthens and improves associations for 
civil purposes. * * * Political life makes the love and 
practice of association more general; it imparts a desire 
of union, and teaches the means of combination to 
numbers of men who would have always lived apart." 
* * * 
((Political associations may therefore be considered 
as large free schools, where all the members of the 
community go to learn the general theory of asso-
ciation.'' 
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CONCLUSION 
lnasn1uch as the trial court was satisfied with the merits 
of the petitioners' case as to the facts and the law on all points 
except as to the one problem of interpreting the phrase "any 
other type of association," we have confined our attention to 
this problem. We take the general position that the phrase does 
indeed mean any type of association, and specifically, that 
whatever type of association it does or does not include, surely 
it must include political associations because of their tradi-
tional and well-recognized influence upon the acquiring and 
retention of jobs in our various bodies of government. The 
influence of political associations in this respect is not unlike 
the influence of unions, and to whatever extent, whether great 
or small, that any association has such influence, just to that 
extent did the Legislature intend this right-to-work law to be 
effective. With this view of the matter, the trial Court clearly 
erred in assuming that the intent of the Law was not to include 
political parties within the meaning of associations. The relief 
sought by petitioners should be granted, namely that the dam-
ages which the Court has already assessed, together with any 
other damage which the petitioners can show since the trial, be 
granted the petitioners, and they, and each of them, be restored 
,. 
to their employment with Utah County. 
1{espectfully submitted, 
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APPENDIX 
J. BRACKEN LEE, called as a witness by and on behalf 
of the Petitioners, was sworn and testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. BECK: 
Q. Mayor, would you state for the record your resi-
dence and present occupation and name? 
A. My name is J. Bracken Lee. My occupation is, at the 
present time, is Mayor of Salt Lake City. My address 
is 2031 Laird Drive, Salt Lake City. 
Q. How long, approximately have you been a resident 
of Salt Lake City? 
A. Thirteen years. 
Q. Prior to your tenure as Mayor of Salt Lake City, Mr. 
Lee, did you hold any executive position with the 
State of Utah? 
A. I did. 
Q. Will you state what it was? 
A. I was, served as Governor of the State of Utah from 
1949 to January 195 7. 
Q. I invite your attention, Mayor, to a session of the 
Legislature in about 195 5 that enacted a certain 
measure or measures, affecting generally the em-
ployee-employer relationship and ask you if you 
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remember specifically a bill commonly known and 
styled as the Right to Work Bill? 
A. I do. 
Q. In other words, the short title of that bill was known 
as Right to Work? 
A. That is right. 
Q. Was that bill enacted during your tenure as Chief 
Executive of the State of Utah? 
A. It was. 
Q. Did you sign that bill into law ? 
A. I did. 
Q. Did you conduct any meetings by yourself through 
committees or otherwise respecting, affecting the 
enactment of that right to work bill? 
A. Yes. Many meetings. 
Q. Could you state with whom and for what purpose 
you held such meetings ? 
A. Yes. 
Q. I mean just generally. 
A. To discuss the merits of the bill with members of 
the different labor unions. The state head of the 
labor unions, a committee from the House. A com-
mittee from the Senate. And different groups of 
legislators. 
Q. During the progress, prior to the enactment, and 
what I want to get at is the historical background 
of the bill as it was then in development and being 
written and approaching enactment, what was pri-
marily the purpose of you convening these respec-
tive meetings ? Committee meetings and otherwise? 
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A. The first, well I might say that I had a number of 
meetings with Ross Thoreson. 
Q. Will you state who Ross Thoreson was and what 
his function was in the enactment of this bill ? 
A. He was a member of the legislature and the one 
who sponsored the bill. I talked to him, a number 
of legislators. They asked me what I would do if 
this bill was passed, and I told them that I would 
sign the bill. 
MR. TAYLOR: We object to that and ask that it be 
stricken as hearsay. 
THE COURT: The objection is sustained. The answer 
is ordered stricken. 
Q. I understood you to say that Ross Thurman, Ross 
Thoreson was the sponsor of the Right to Work 
bill? 
A. One of the sponsors, yes. 
Q. Did he attend some meetings respecting enactment 
of this bill in your office during the time, the process 
of its being enacted? 
A. He did. 
Q.If you know, for what purpose did he meet with you 
and others? 
A. To determine the attitude, my attitude toward the 
bill. I 
MR. TAYLOR: We object to that question and the 
answer on the grounds that it is immaterial, hearsay. 
THE COURT: Well, he doesn't quote anything. He 
simply states what the purpose was so it wouldn't 
be hearsay exactly. 
38 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
MR. TAYLOR: We fail to see the materiality, Your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: What do you claim for it? 
MR. BECK: Merely preliminary, if Your Honor please. 
THE COURT: Preliminary to what? 
MR. BECK: To the introduction of an exhibit and two 
more questions. 
THE COURT: Well, let the answer remain. 
MR. BECK: I might state generally this, Your Honor, 
in all frankness. We have been through at least 
three different sessions respecting this case respect-
ing law points, and the primary purpose of that is 
to place before Your Honor and in the record the 
position of somebody that was present during the 
history of the time the bill was enacted, in other 
words legislative history. 
THE COURT: Well, can you prove legislative history 
that way? 
MR. BECK: I would state this generally, if Your Honor 
please, that legislative history may be proven by one 
who sponsors a bill, a committeeman who partici-
pates in it, by legislative entries and by official com-
munications issued or adopted during the process of 
the time the bill was enacted. However, I will state 
that this would be, this is preliminary and if counsel 
want to make an objection I think-
THE COURT, Well, he answered the question, let it 
remain and you may proceed. 
Q. Now during that time, Mayor, did you yourself 
actively participate in the drafting of the Right to 
Work bill as it was ultimately passed and became 
law? 
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A. Yes, a portion of it. 
Q. What portion did you, what portion of the bill 
did you actively participate in the writing of? 
A. That portion, which set forth those who would be 
affected by the bill. 
Q. Now was the circle of those that would be affected 
by the bill reduced or enlarged as a result of your 
amendment? 
MR. CORNABY: We object to that as immaterial, if 
Your Honor please. 
THE COURT: I don't see the materiality. 
MR. BECK: The purpose behind that question, if Your 
Honor please, was to, was to elicit just exactly what 
the issue was during the time the bill was in process 
of being enacted by the people who were charged 
with enac;ting the bill. 
(Discussion between Court and Counsel.) 
MR. BECK: I might shorten this just a little probably 
by-Then counsel can make a more formal objection. 
May this be marked. 
Q. Mayor Lee, I invite your attention to what has been 
marked for identification in this case as Petitioner's 
Exhibit No. 1 and ask you if that appears to be a 
facsimilie of your signature on the bottom? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And was that an official communication that was 
sent out by you during the time you were chief 
executive of the State of Utah explaining the Right 
to Work Bill that we have under examination today? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you know approximately how many copies of 
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that communication were sent out? Just guess, or 
just an estimate. 
A. Better than a hundred. 
Q. Do you know the reason it was sent out? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Would you tell us please? 
A. To explain my reasons for supporting the bill. And 
to set forth-
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